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National Bureau of Economic Research
For most of the last century, the U.S. health care system was
financed primarily through traditional indemnity health insurance plans
that paid doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers on a fee-
for-service basis.  By the 1960s, most Americans received insurance of
this type through either their employers or government programs, such
as Medicare and Medicaid (HIAA 1991).  In the midst of economic
prosperity that minimized constraints on the revenues they could col-
lect, and faced with the then comparatively low cost of health care,
health insurers and the government provided ample funding for the
widespread provision of ever more advanced health care.  In the pro-
cess, this subsidized and encouraged the training of new physicians,
the building of new infrastructure, and the development of increasingly
advanced, and almost always more expensive, technologies.  By all
accounts, these developments contributed significantly to the capabili-
ties of medicine to cure disease and improve the health and functioning
of patients.  By the 1970s and 1980s, though, rapidly increasing costs
gave rise to a number of cost-containment efforts.  Perhaps the most
prominent of these efforts is the growth of managed care, encompass-
ing a range of changes in the practices of health insurers that have
eroded the pillars of the traditional fee-for-service health care financing
system.
The growth of managed care has raised important questions about
its impact on the well-being of patients.  An increasing number of
opponents argue that expansion of managed care has put cost cutting
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front and center, displacing concerns about quality and health, and will
inevitably harm patients and reduce the well-being of the U.S. popula-
tion.  But this view may not be completely correct.  Advocates of man-
aged care argue that fee-for-service medicine fostered waste and
inefficiency, and that by developing better methods of allocating
resources, society can obtain the same value from its health care sys-
tem for less money.  Moreover, maintaining the traditional health care
financing system was increasingly costly, and savings generated by
managed care can also contribute value to society.
Much of the public debate about the impact of managed care has
been conducted around opinion and anecdote, without careful analysis
of the large body of evidence available on the impact of managed care
on health care, outcomes, and costs.  This chapter aims to contribute to
these debates by presenting and synthesizing key evidence, seeking to
evaluate what is known about the impact of managed care on the well-
being of the U.S. population.  The first sections briefly discuss the ori-
gins and definition of managed care and present a framework for ana-
lyzing the impact of managed care on the well-being of society.  The
next section reviews evidence on treatment patterns, outcomes, satis-
faction, and expenditures in managed care organizations.  Following
that is a discussion of the impact of managed care on non–managed
care patients and on the structure and functioning of the health care
system in general.  The next section presents some supplementary evi-
dence on cost savings from growth in managed care.  The final sections
synthesize the evidence presented, discuss welfare implications, and
consider the future of managed care.
WHAT IS MANAGED CARE AND 
WHERE DID IT COME FROM?
The health care system that grew up in the United States after
World War II was a lavishly funded affair.  With a strong economy, it
was relatively easy for employers to include generous indemnity health
insurance in employee compensation packages.  These insurance plans
typically provided broad coverage of health care spending with no
restrictions on the physicians or hospitals used by the beneficiaries,
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provided for little oversight, if any, of the treatment decisions made by
physicians, and placed few restraints on the amounts that could be
charged.  Free spending in the private sector was augmented by exten-
sive public sector spending in the form of the Medicare and Medicaid
programs, providing fee-for-service coverage for the elderly and poor,
as well as  programs like the Hill-Burton program for the development
of hospital infrastructure, and the National Institutes of Health for
medical research.
 Although financial incentives are not the only force that influences
the health care delivery system, they can play an important role in
shaping the system’s institutions and behavior.  It is perhaps not sur-
prising that the health care system that grew up in this environment
reflected, in at least some ways, the financial forces that nurtured it.
With few financial constraints, it was easy for providers to supply their
patients with many advanced services.  Under many traditional indem-
nity plans, neither the patient nor the provider bore any of the cost of
treatment, so one would expect providers and patients to demand all
services that would have had even some probability of a benefit for the
patient, even those that were very costly to the insurer and to society.
Moreover, the inclination to do everything possible for patients was
reinforced by the fact that providers paid on a fee-for-service basis
received additional compensation for furnishing more—and more
expensive—services.  Because increasing numbers of patients had
insurance, these incentives helped to ensure the availability of
advanced medicine to broad segments of the population.
Beyond influencing the treatments provided for individual patients
in a physician’s office or hospital, the availability of generous compen-
sation for providing extensive and expensive care with the latest tech-
niques also influenced the infrastructure of medicine.  It attracted new
medical students who ultimately contributed to the increasing number
of physicians, particularly specialists; it fostered the development of
new hospitals; and it encouraged the adoption of new techniques and
equipment, in turn creating a ready market for the purchase of new
innovations that helped fuel a large and active research establishment.
All of this contributed to the formation of a health care delivery
system that enjoyed wide public support as a world leader, particularly
with respect to its advancement and ability to make high-tech care
available to broad segments of the population.  But, maintaining this
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system turned out to be a costly endeavor.  The United States spent
then, and continues to spend now, markedly more than any other coun-
try in the world.  In 1997, the United States spent 13.9 percent of its
gross domestic product on health care, while the next highest figure
was from Germany, at 10.7 percent.  Other industrialized countries like
France (9.6 percent), Canada (9.2 percent) and the United Kingdom
(6.8 percent) were even lower (OECD 1999). 
 As the costs of sustaining the system increased over time, cracks
began to appear in the foundation of public support that backed the sys-
tem.  Spending large amounts of money to obtain highly valued items
is easily justifiable, but, first in the 1960s and more evidently in the
1970s and 1980s, some began to question whether the value received
from the health care system was commensurate with the level of spend-
ing.  Some of the unease was generated by the fear that additional
health care spending was not generating significant improvements in
health.  Despite leading the world in health care spending, life expect-
ancy, infant mortality, and other population-level indicators of health
remained worse in the United States than in other developed countries.
Moreover, some evidence suggested that excessive health care, poten-
tially detrimental to health, was being provided.  One study found that
at least one-third of carotid endarterectomies, surgery to improve blood
flow to the brain, were unnecessary and inappropriate, as were at least
17 percent of angiograms, invasive X rays of the coronary arteries
(Brook 1989).  Both of these procedures carried nontrivial risks to
patients, and the knowledge that these and other potentially risky pro-
cedures were being overprovided gave further reason for reexamination
of the incentives in the system.  If it is health that ultimately produces
the value society derives from the health care system (a debatable prop-
osition to which I return below), then spending that does not produce
health is inefficient and should be redirected to purchase other goods or
services that generate value for society.
All of this led to a variety of efforts to mitigate the incentives gen-
erated by the traditional insurance system that appeared to be encour-
aging high spending on things of questionable value.  These efforts
included things like the widespread introduction of co-payments and
deductibles, the imposition of second opinion requirements for elective
procedures, and Medicare’s Prospective Payment System.  Most prom-
inent among them, though, is the growth of managed care, which began
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in earnest in the early 1970s and reached full swing during the 1980s
and 1990s.
 The term managed care refers collectively to a set of activities that
health plans and others can undertake to mitigate the propensity for the
provision of more and more expensive services fostered by unmoni-
tored fee-for-service medicine.  There are three main managed care
strategies.  The first is centralization of control over utilization deci-
sions.  Fee-for-service medicine was characterized by virtually com-
plete autonomy on the part of physicians and other providers, in
consultation with the patient, with respect to care choices.  Under man-
aged care, health plans can take on more significant roles in overseeing
care choices.  For example, patients and their physicians may be forced
to obtain preapproval from a utilization review organization for diag-
nostic tests or surgical procedures if the plan is to pay for the services.
Plans can then deny approval for services that they deem to be inappro-
priate uses of resources.  Many plans regulate the use of specialists by
forcing patients to sign up with a particular primary care physician or
group of physicians and then obtain a referral from this “gatekeeper”
physician or group when specialized services are required.  Plans can
also engage in activities like promulgating guidelines for care or devel-
oping detailed formularies of approved pharmaceutical products for
which they will pay, effectively limiting prescribing to the approved
list.  Less direct forms of control are also possible.  For example, many
plans periodically review the practice patterns of physicians to identify
those whose use of services appears excessive, and they may provide
incentives for meeting the targets.
 Second, health plans can impose indirect controls on utilization by
using financial arrangements that put providers at risk for the financial
implications of the patient care decisions they make.  For example,
plans can use capitation contracts in which physician groups (or even
individual physicians) are paid a fixed amount per patient per month to
care for the patients who have signed up with them.  This effectively
reverses the fee-for-service incentive to provide more care to each
patient.  In other cases, plans may withhold a portion of the payments
due to physicians and reallocate these funds at the end of the year
based on the performance of physicians or groups in meeting utiliza-
tion, quality, or other targets imposed by the plans.
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Finally, health plans may define networks of physicians and health
care providers with whom they will work and provide incentives for
patients to see only those providers chosen.  Defining a panel offers
plans the advantage of selecting only those providers with whom they
are interested in working, as well as the potential to obtain contracting
advantages and discounts from physicians who would like to be
included in the panel.  Some plans define relatively broad networks of
affiliated physicians and providers, while other plans focus their efforts
on building relatively narrow panels and carefully managing them to
include only those providers whose patterns of practice are most con-
sistent with their goals.  Plans that have formed networks can impose
restrictions on the ability of patients to choose providers outside of the
network.  Some plans will not pay for care delivered by physicians or
hospitals not included in the approved panel.  Other plans provide
some financial incentives for patients to see providers in the panel, but
they will pay at least part of the bill for out-of-network care. 
Beyond the three main categories of plan activities, there is a wide
range of other things that plans can do to influence practice patterns.
Many plans engage in efforts to change physician opinions about the
best ways to care for their patients.  They may, for example, provide
information and work with physicians to define standards for care.
Plans may also influence practice patterns simply by collecting data on
the performance of services that the plan or other observers like the
National Center for Quality Assurance believe to be indicators of qual-
ity.
Today, most health plans use more than one of these techniques,
and plans vary widely in the combinations of approaches they use and
in the weight they put on each approach.  To some extent, different
combinations of approaches define the stereotypical organizational
forms that are commonly observed in the marketplace.  Staff and group
model HMOs, like Kaiser Permanente and the Group Health Coopera-
tive of Puget Sound, tend to tightly define a network of providers
whose financial incentives are closely aligned with the incentives of the
plan and restrict patients to choose only providers in the network.
Because the panels are carefully defined and financial incentives are
already integrated, there is relatively little need to impose strong cen-
tral controls on utilization or use financial incentives to limit costs.
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Independent practice association (IPA) model HMOs typically
have more loosely defined networks of physicians and restrict patients
to remain within the network.  The looseness of the network and the
lack of integration with the plan requires stronger efforts to contain uti-
lization.  IPA-model HMOs vary in the emphasis they place on finan-
cial incentives as opposed to direct controls, but the prototypical IPA-
model HMO relies heavily on some combination of them.
Preferred-provider organizations (PPOs) are characterized by rela-
tively loose panels, some incentives to choose providers in the network
(but weaker incentives than those used by HMOs), and limited efforts
to control utilization.  As a result, PPOs have been regarded as poten-
tially less effective at controlling costs than other organizations.  Many
formerly unmanaged indemnity plans have also adopted managed care
techniques over the past years, typically consisting of efforts to impose
some (frequently limited) central control on utilization patterns. 
Taken as a whole, the growth of managed care represents a massive
shift in the financial incentives at work in the U.S. health care system.
Between 1981 and 1998, HMO enrollment grew from 10 million to
105.3 million, with about 30 percent of this growth coming after 1995
(Hoechst Marion Roussel 1999; Interstudy 1994).  PPO growth was
also substantial, and by some accounts the vast majority of the U.S.
non-elderly population was enrolled in some form of managed care
plan by the late 1990s.
A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING 
THE IMPACT OF MANAGED CARE
Growth in managed care has prompted questions about its impact
on the health care system and on the well-being of patients, which
could be evaluated from a number of different perspectives.  Here, I
take society’s perspective and attempt to discuss the issues important in
determining whether society’s total utility, or value, has been increased
or decreased by managed care.
Individuals can be characterized as getting utility from three
things.  First, people get utility from health.  Second, people can get
utility from the amenities or other attributes of the health care system
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that do not necessarily improve health but reduce their hassles or
increase their enjoyment.  People value short waiting times in doctors
offices and friendly staff, even if these things do not directly make
them healthier.  The American public has also expressed a desire for
high-tech, advanced care even though this has not always been shown
to produce better health than lower-tech, less aggressive medicine.
Some people may simply value the knowledge that they are receiving
the most up-to-date treatments from the most highly trained specialists.
For others, receipt of high tech therapies may foster the perception that
health is being maximally improved, even in cases where this is not
actually the case.  Finally, individuals get utility from the amount of
money they have left after their spending on health care, including
health insurance, out-of-pocket spending, and spending for any other
health care goods and services.  I can thus write a representative indi-
vidual’s utility function as 
Eq. 1 u = u(h, a, y – yh ),
where h denotes health, a denotes amenities, y denotes income, and yh
denotes spending on health care.  Obtaining the maximum amount of
utility requires trading off the purchase of more and better health care,
which could generate more health and better amenities, with consump-
tion of other things.
Society consists of many individuals, so from society’s perspective
one can write
Eq. 2 U = U(H, A, Y – Yh).
For simplicity, society’s total utility could be thought of as a summa-
tion of the utility of each individual, although in reality it is probably
more complicated than that.  Thinking about overall social utility,
though, produces the same problem for society as for an individual.  In
order to obtain the maximum amount of collective utility, we must
trade off the purchase of more health care with nicer amenities against
the use of our collective income for other pursuits.
The social perspective can differ in important ways from the indi-
vidual perspective.  Most notably, focusing on social utility maximiza-
tion allows for trade-offs between members of society.  Foregoing
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expensive services with low probability of success for some patients,
and using the savings to purchase immunizations for others might
improve total social utility, but it would be redistributive, producing
individual winners and losers.  The incidence of costs can also vary
among individuals—some may save more or pay more than others
toward the collective social spending on health care.  Although individ-
ual-level analyses of welfare can be interesting and important, the
question of overall social benefit or loss is an important question from
a general policy perspective, and it is the one I focus on here.
 The question, then, is whether social utility is higher or lower in a
world dominated by managed care than it would have been in a (hypo-
thetical) world without managed care.  In a given time period t, a sys-
tem dominated by managed care will produce some level of health,
amenities, and spending that will yield a level of utility UtM.  A fee-for-
service system would also produce some level of health, amenities, and
spending, generating UtF.  Society is better off with managed care at
that point in time if UtM > UtF and worse off if UtM < UtF.
Since the health care system is continuing to evolve, an evaluation
would also do well to take into account both present and future levels
of utility, with appropriate discounting to account for the difference
between value now and value later.  When utilities over time are taken
into account, activities that have value now but hurt future value, like
cost cutting that produces no current change in treatments but does
affect research and hence the prospects for future treatments, would
have to be weighed against each other.
Without knowing the specific functional forms, it is impossible to
precisely evaluate society’s utility or the impact managed care has on
it.  However, given information about the impact of managed care on
health, amenities and patient satisfaction, and costs, we can draw infer-
ences about the likely effects.  That is, an informed perspective on this
question can be obtained by evaluating any reduction in health and
amenities managed care has brought about relative to any savings it has
generated.  The next three sections discuss the large and growing litera-
ture that provides insight into these questions.
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TREATMENT PATTERNS, SATISFACTION, AND 
OUTCOMES FOR PATIENTS IN MANAGED CARE
 One important body of literature compares treatment patterns,
health outcomes, satisfaction, and spending for patients who enroll in
managed care organizations and those who do not.  This literature con-
tains hundreds of studies, and I do not attempt to review them all here.
Rather, I summarize the results of several good reviews that synthesize
information from the many original studies.  Luft (1981) summarized
studies done between 1959 and 1975.  Miller and Luft (1994) compiled
results from studies done between 1980 and 1993.  Miller and Luft
(1997) compiled results from studies done between 1994 and 1997.
Dudley et al. (1998) reviewed work primarily on outcomes done
between 1980 and 1997.1  A wide range of studies are also reviewed in
Glied (2000) and Chernew et al. (1998).2
The comparison studies discussed here share some general charac-
teristics.  First, they almost all focus on patients enrolled in HMOs.
This is useful because HMOs are a classic form of managed care orga-
nization and are still probably the most aggressive form of managed
care organization in the marketplace.  Yet, existing studies provide little
information about the experience of patients in PPOs or other types of
managed care plans.
Second, almost all of these studies attempt to compare patients in
HMOs to patients in traditional indemnity plans.  This is a sensible
comparison group, but it does raise issues because of the general evolu-
tion of health plans over the past decade.  It is relatively rare now to
find even indemnity health insurers that have not adopted some man-
aged care strategies.  Earlier studies may thus provide more easily
interpretable comparisons than later studies, because the characteristics
of the control group in earlier studies are clearer.  More recently, stud-
ies of Medicare patients may be most useful since Medicare maintains
a relatively unmonitored fee-for-service system for its traditional
enrollees.
Third, few of these studies are randomized.  Most of them examine
groups of patients for whom the plan in which they are enrolled is the
product of a choice made by the enrollee or by some other entity, like
an employer.  If the health status, preferences, or other characteristics
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of HMO enrollees differ from those of other patients, results from com-
parative studies could be biased.  Indeed, a large body of literature sug-
gests that health status does frequently differ between patients in and
out of HMOs (e.g., Hellinger 1987, 1995; Glied 2000).  Many compar-
ison studies do attempt to control for differences in the characteristics
of patients, but the methods used and the quality of the available con-
trol variables vary from study to study.  One notable exception is the
RAND Health Insurance Experiment, a randomized trial conducted in
the late 1970s and early 1980s.  As part of the trial, 1,149 patients were
randomized to join the Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, a
staff-model HMO, providing a study design capable of avoiding prob-
lems with selection bias (Manning et al. 1984).
Despite these inconveniences, this literature does provide an
important window into the impacts of managed care, producing a num-
ber of very consistent and strong findings.  I review evidence on treat-
ment patterns first, followed by satisfaction, health outcomes, and
spending.
Comparing Treatments for Managed Care 
and Non–Managed Care Patients
 Managed care patients use the hospital less than patients in indem-
nity plans.  The earliest studies indicated lower hospital utilization
stemming from reductions in admission rates (Luft 1981).  Work done
between 1980 and 1993 frequently finds reductions in length of stay as
well.  Miller and Luft (1994) reported that HMO hospital admission
rates were lower in 8 of 11 studies that presented evidence on admis-
sions, with the most credible evidence suggesting reductions of 26 per-
cent to 37 percent.  They also found shorter lengths of stay in 15 of 16
observations in their study, with the strongest evidence suggesting a
length of stay reduction of 14 percent.  Evidence from the RAND
Health Insurance Experiment confirms these results, reporting 40 per-
cent lower inpatient admission rates and total inpatient days among
patients randomized to the HMO arm of the trial (Manning et al. 1984).
The most recent (nonrandomized) evidence, however, produces a less
clear pattern and smaller differences, although there are relatively few
recent results on hospital utilization (Miller and Luft 1997).
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A common goal of managed care plans is to replace relatively
expensive hospital utilization with less expensive outpatient care.
Thus, one might expect to see reductions in hospital use offset by
increases in outpatient visits.  Although early evidence tended to sup-
port this view (Luft 1981), more recent evidence is not as clear.  Miller
and Luft (1994) found higher outpatient utilization among HMO
patients in half of the 14 observations they reviewed, and lower outpa-
tient utilization in the others (although the studies they reviewed with
the strongest data tended to suggest higher or similar outpatient utiliza-
tion in HMOs).  Miller and Luft (1997) reported no overall pattern in
the results of studies done between 1994 and 1997.  Evidence from the
RAND Health Insurance Experiment also suggested no differences in
the overall rate of face-to-face visits (Manning et al. 1984).
A wide range of studies suggest that patients enrolled in HMOs are
less likely to get intensive, costly tests and procedures.  Miller and
Luft’s two reviews (1994, 1997) included a total of 24 observations on
a range of advanced and frequently expensive services, including treat-
ments associated with childbirth, heart disease, and cancer.  They
found less use among HMO patients in 22 of the 24 cases.  In most of
these cases the reductions were relatively large: the modal odds ratio
associated with HMO enrollment was about 0.80, indicating that the
odds of receiving the intensive procedure were about 20 percent lower
in HMOs relative to indemnity plans.  Some more recent studies con-
firm these findings.  For example, Chernew, Fendrick, and Hirth (1997)
reported lower use of cholecystectomy in HMO patients than indem-
nity patients at a given point in time.
Interestingly, while many studies report lower use of costly tests
and procedures among HMO patients at a given point in time, some
research suggests that trends over time are similar in and outside of
HMOs (Chernew et al. 1998).  For example, Langa and Sussman
(1993) found similar growth between 1983 and 1988 in the use of cor-
onary revascularization among HMO and non-HMO patients, although
HMO patients use the technology less at any given point in time.
Chernew, Fendrick, and Hirth (1997) showed that the change in chole-
cystectomy use by HMO patients over 1989–1994 was similar to the
change seen in the overall health care system.
Studies also suggest that HMO enrollees are also less likely to get
access to home health care than indemnity patients.  Both Miller and
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Luft (1997) and Dudley et al. (1998) identified multiple studies indicat-
ing significantly less home health use among HMO patients.
 On the other hand, HMO patients are more likely to receive pre-
ventive care.  Miller and Luft (1994) reported that HMO enrollees con-
sistently receive more preventive tests, including cancer screening,
hypertension screening, and a variety of regular examinations.  HMO
enrollees also receive more health promotion activities, like smoking
cessation counseling, than indemnity plan enrollees.  Dudley et al.
(1998) confirmed this finding with more recent data.  Evidence from
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment also supports this view, find-
ing higher rates of preventive visits among those randomized to the
HMO (Manning et al. 1984).
Comparing Satisfaction for Managed Care 
and Non–Managed Care Patients
Along with changes in treatment patterns have come many changes
in the amenities of the health care system.  In pursuit of lower costs,
managed care plans have imposed restrictions on patient choice of pro-
viders; minimized staff, which has led to shorter visit times and less
opportunity for interaction; and placed more burdens on patients to
navigate increasingly complex systems for obtaining approval for care.
Many patients, along with their doctors, have sought care that was
denied, sometimes for reasons that are difficult to understand.  Many
physicians are dissatisfied with the payment rates of managed care
plans.  Increasing reliance on gatekeeper physicians and financial
incentives that reward physicians for doing less have undermined
patient trust in physicians, which can color the perceptions of both
patients and physicians.  As they have become more prominent, these
kinds of changes have led to widespread anecdotal reports of dissatis-
faction and backlash among patients and providers.
 Consistent with these reports, studies that assess overall patient
satisfaction almost always find that HMO enrollees are less satisfied
with their plans than enrollees in other types of plans, primarily indem-
nity or PPO plans (Miller and Luft 1994, 1997; Dudley et al. 1998).
This overall finding is not surprising, but it has two important nuances
that should be noted.  First, studies that separately identify satisfaction
with financial and nonfinancial aspects of health plans typically find
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the greatest discontent in nonfinancial areas.  HMO enrollees systemat-
ically report being less satisfied with things like the technical profi-
ciency of the care they received, their relationships with clinicians, the
amount of time spent with clinicians, and access and availability of
specialists.  On the other hand, HMO enrollees are frequently more sat-
isfied with the financial aspects of their plans.  Managed care plans fre-
quently require less out-of-pocket spending than indemnity plans with
potentially high deductibles.  Managed care plans can also require less
paperwork to handle for insurance reimbursement than indemnity
plans.
Second, studies that focus on lower-income populations, many of
which have joined HMOs under emerging Medicaid managed care pro-
grams, frequently find that HMO enrollees are more satisfied with both
financial and nonfinancial aspects of their plans.  This may be under-
standable given that many of these patients are covered by Medicaid,
and fee-for-service Medicaid has historically been very difficult to nav-
igate.  Outside of Medicaid, lower-income groups seeking low premi-
ums can end up in high-deductible or other stringent plans that do not
offer much care to enrollees.
Comparing Health Outcomes for Managed Care 
and Non–Managed Care Patients
On the whole, the literature on health outcomes fails to find a con-
sistent pattern either for or against HMOs.  Studies from the 1980s and
early 1990s tend to suggest equal or better quality of care in HMOs.
Fourteen of 17 observations summarized by Miller and Luft (1994)
showed HMOs to be the same as or better than indemnity plans on a
range of measures, including care for patients with congestive heart
failure, colorectal cancer, diabetes, hypertension, cerebrovascular acci-
dent, or chronic problems like joint pain and chest pain.  Only a few
observations suggested worse quality of care in HMOs.
 But, this pattern disappears in more recent work.  Miller and Luft
(1997) reviewed a number of articles that examined outcomes ranging
from mortality to measures of physical functioning among patients
with specific serious health conditions, to more general measures of
patient health applicable to the broad population.  Some of the studies
reviewed found better outcomes in HMOs, including studies showing
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HMO enrollees having lower risk of ruptured appendix, lower risk of
dying in the intensive care unit, lower breast cancer mortality, better
stage at diagnosis of cancer, better physical functioning (as measured
by activities of daily living [ADL] and instrumental activities of daily
living [IADL] scales), better glycosylated hemoglobin levels among
diabetics, and better mental health functioning.  On the other hand, a
number of studies found worse outcomes in HMOs, including studies
reporting higher mortality rates among breast cancer patients and high-
risk newborns, as well as worse physical and mental health functioning
among chronically ill patients and elderly patients.  In between, a large
number of studies reported no pattern of different results or a mixture
of findings favorable and unfavorable to HMOs.
Of 35 observations considered by Dudley et al. (1998) comparing
mortality, clinically significant morbidity, and laboratory abnormali-
ties,  most found no significant differences between HMOs and indem-
nity plans.  Among the few that did find significant differences, there
was no clear pattern favoring either HMOs or indemnity plans.  Dudley
et al. (1998) also reviewed several studies of process of care measures.
Here, although a number of studies found differences between HMOs
and indemnity plans in one direction or another, there was also no clear
pattern favoring one over the other.
This literature supports the general view that there is not a system-
atic effect of HMOs on outcomes.  In particular, there is no clear evi-
dence that population outcomes are systematically worse in HMOs.
That said, though, it is important to note that there are some subgroups
of the population that evidence suggests may be affected.  First,
although the literature is not unanimous, there is some evidence that
outcomes are worse among vulnerable populations in HMOs (e.g.,
Ware et al. 1996), which may give rise to concern for their well-being.
Second, there are some particular conditions for which outcomes in
HMOs appear to be worse and others for which outcomes appear to be
better.  Drawing the general conclusion that there is no systematic
effect of HMOs based on population-wide evidence from a number of
different conditions implicitly assumes that each of society’s constitu-
ent subgroups and all health conditions should carry equal weight in an
overall assessment.  But this need not be the case.  Society may find it
desirable to put more weight on the health outcomes of some members
of the population, like the socioeconomically disadvantaged, or give
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more weight to those who suffer from some diseases and less to those
who suffer from others.  In this case, a thorough evaluation would need
to aggregate results for each population group and condition, weighting
by measures of their significance.  Developing a scheme to weight con-
ditions and carrying out such a calculation is beyond the scope of this
chapter and will have to be left for future study.
The fact that the literature does not support the view that outcomes
are systematically worse in managed care plans may be something of a
surprise given the extensive news coverage devoted to the adverse
impacts of managed care on health.  But, it is important to remember
that bad things happened to undeserving patients under fee-for-service
too.  In some cases, it is likely that this was the result of overprovision
of care encouraged by the financing system, although such events were
rarely reported in the press and were certainly not linked to the health
insurance system in place at the time. 
It is interesting to note that the earliest studies suggested better out-
comes in HMOs than outside, but this pattern fades with time.  One
(although not the only) interpretation of this finding is that the spread
of managed care has influenced treatment patterns throughout the mar-
ket, leading differences between HMOs and other plans to disappear
over time as the other plans come to more closely resemble HMOs.
Comparing Expenditures for Managed Care 
and Non–Managed Care Patients
Studies of expenditures by HMO and indemnity patients frequently
report that expenditures are lower in HMOs.  Miller and Luft (1997)
reported that the majority of the studies they reviewed showed lower
total spending on health care for HMO patients than fee-for-service
patients, with spending differences ranging from 16 percent to 34 per-
cent.  Earlier data are sparser, but the two studies reviewed by Miller
and Luft (1994) that provided information about total spending
reported spending by HMO enrollees to be 11–13 percent lower than
spending by fee-for-service patients.  Note that these expenditures
include spending by the plan on health care received, not the premiums
paid for coverage or other costs.  From society’s perspective, expendi-
tures for care are perhaps the more important dimension to consider.
Managed Care and Social Welfare 49
While most of the evidence available focuses on HMOs, there is
some limited evidence on expenditures for PPO patients, but it ends up
mixed.  Smith (1997) suggested that PPO patients have lower expendi-
tures than indemnity patients, but Hosek et al. (1990) found that PPOs
have higher unit costs.
EVIDENCE FROM MARKET LEVEL STUDIES
Additional information about the impacts of managed care is avail-
able from studies that compare the performance of the health care sys-
tem in market areas with high levels of managed care activity and
market areas with lower levels.  The approach taken in these kinds of
studies is to classify markets3  based on the overall level of managed
care activity, frequently measured as HMO market share (i.e., the pro-
portion of the population enrolled in an HMO), and then examine dif-
ferences in the structure of the health care delivery system, treatments,
costs, and outcomes in markets with varying levels of market share.
One important aspect of market level studies is exploration of the
so-called “spillover effects” of managed care, by which the presence of
managed care in an area influences care for patients not enrolled in
managed care plans.  This could occur through a variety of mecha-
nisms.  Managed care could influence the structure of the health care
delivery system or its capabilities.  For example, markets with high lev-
els of managed care activity could end up with more outpatient surgery
centers and fewer MRI machines, which could influence the treatment
options available even to non–managed care patients.  The presence of
managed care could also influence the treatment choices of physicians
if managed care plans disseminate information or otherwise influence
physician practice patterns, and this information reaches physicians
who care for non–managed care patients.
Comparing Expenditures among Markets
Expenditures are by far the most common focus of market compar-
isons (see, e.g., Baker 1997, 1999; Clement et al. 1992; Feldman et al.
1986; Gaskin and Hadley 1997; Noether 1988; McLaughlin 1987,
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1988; Robinson, 1991, 1996; Rodgers and Smith, 1995; Welch, 1994).4
Most of these studies focus on overall expenditures, including expendi-
tures by both managed care and non–managed care patients, but some
include only expenditures by non–managed care patients to explicitly
explore the potential for spillover effects on spending.  Many of these
studies focus on in-hospital spending, although some of them examine
broader measures that encompass spending on outpatient and other
care.  Using whatever measure, though, these studies by and large
report that overall spending and spending for non–managed care
patients is lower in areas with high levels of market share.  In particu-
lar, more recent studies clearly suggest that the presence of managed
care in an area reduces overall hospital expenditures and spending for
fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries.
Interpreting the results of these studies is complicated by the fact
that expenditures are the product of price and quantity, so lower expen-
ditures could reflect change in one or the other or both.  Some of the
evidence is consistent with the view that treatment patterns have
changed, so that patients in high managed care areas (even non–man-
aged care patients) receive fewer intensive treatments and fewer hospi-
talizations.  Medicare hospital expenditures, for example, should not be
strongly subject to variation in price since the Prospective Payment
System centrally determines prices.  Hence, the most natural interpre-
tation of studies that show reductions in Medicare inpatient spending
associated with higher managed care activity (e.g., Baker 1997, 1999;
Clement et al. 1992; Rodgers and Smith 1995) is that practice patterns
have shifted so that patients receive fewer hospitalizations and fewer
intensive tests and procedures.  Some direct evidence supports this
finding.  Baker et al. (2000b) and Heidenreich et al., (2000) reported
that treatments for fee-for-service Medicare patients who suffered
acute myocardial infarctions varied with the level of area HMO market
share.
Outside of Medicare, it is more plausible that increased managed
care activity led to reductions in the prices charged by hospitals and
other providers, which could contribute to reductions in overall expen-
ditures in some of these studies.  Some studies suggest that increased
competition between hospitals can reduce expenditures (Chernew et al.
1998), and that the presence of managed care plans can enhance com-
petition (Kessler and McClellan 2000; Feldman et al. 1990).
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Comparing Infrastructure and Capabilities among Markets
A range of market comparison studies suggest that managed care
can influence the number and types of providers, the capabilities of the
health care system, and the ways in which the system is organized.  In
most cases, these studies report that the characteristics of high man-
aged care markets reflect the changes in care patterns that managed
care brings about.  Consistent with findings that managed care plans
tend to use hospitals less, Chernew (1995) reported that areas with
higher HMO market share had fewer hospital beds in the mid and late
1980s.  Consistent with the view that managed care plans are apt to use
less care overall and refer their patients to specialist physicians less
often, Escarce et al. (1998, 2000) and Polsky et al. (2000) reported that
high managed care areas attract and retain fewer physicians, particu-
larly specialists.  Consistent with the fact that managed care plans tend
to selectively contract with a limited number of providers to obtain
many services for their patients, Baker and Brown (1999) reported that
managed care prompted consolidation in the mammography market.
Managed care may also contribute to consolidation in other provider
markets.  Burns et al. (2000) reported that physicians and hospitals in
markets with more HMOs (although not higher market share) were
more likely to form alliances between 1993 and 1995 compared to
those in markets with fewer HMOs.
Evidence also supports the view that managed care has slowed the
adoption of many technologies, particularly high-cost, infrastructure-
intensive new technologies.  Baker and Wheeler (1998) and Baker
(forthcoming) suggested that high managed care areas saw slower
adoption of MRI equipment over the 1980s and 1990s.  Baker and
Phibbs (2000) suggested that managed care slowed the adoption of
mid-level neonatal intensive care units (NICUs).  Cutler and Sheiner
(1998) reported that managed care is associated with slower diffusion
of a range of hospital-based technologies.  Cutler and McClellan
(1996) showed that high managed care areas adopted cardiac revascu-
larization services at slower rates between 1984 and 1991.  This litera-
ture is not unanimous, however.  Baker and Spetz (1999) reported no
differences in an index of hospital technologies between higher and
lower managed care areas, and Hill and Wolfe (1997) reported mixed
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effects of managed care on diffusion of a range of technologies in Wis-
consin during and after a transition to managed care dominance.
Comparing Health Outcomes among Markets
There is relatively little evidence on outcomes from market com-
parison studies.  The evidence that does exist concurs with that dis-
cussed earlier, namely, that there is not a body of work clearly showing
that managed care has systematically worsened outcomes.  Baker and
Brown (1999) examined breast cancer stage at diagnosis and mortality
rates in high and low managed care areas and found no significant dif-
ferences.  Baker et al. (2000b) examined mortality rates for acute myo-
cardial infarction (heart attack) patients and also found no significant
differences.  Baker and Phibbs (2000) reported that mortality rates for
high-risk newborns were probably improved by managed care–induced
reductions in the diffusion of mid-level NICUs.
AGGREGATE SPENDING PATTERNS SINCE 
THE RISE OF MANAGED CARE
Comparisons among plans and among markets suggest that man-
aged care is able to lower expenditures to at least some extent.  Another
source of information is the patterns in overall health care spending
over the time period in which managed care has come to play an
important role in the health care system.  After rising at an annual rate
of more than 10 percent between 1980 and 1990, annual growth in
spending slowed to a rate of 4–5 percent between 1994 and 1997,5
about the time when managed care had grown to the point where it
could plausibly be a force in U.S. health expenditures.  The slowdown
was most pronounced in hospital spending, where annual growth rates
fell to just above 3 percent during this time period, consistent with
research suggesting that managed care has particularly targeted hospi-
tal use.  Other areas of spending that do not seem to have been as
strong a focus of managed care plans during this period, like prescrip-
tion drugs, maintained high growth rates.
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More recently, however, rates of increase in spending have picked
up.  Figures for 1998, the most current available at the time of this writ-
ing, suggest annual growth in total health care spending was higher
than it had been in previous years, although still below the 10 percent
increases seen in the 1980s.
SYNTHESIS: ARE WE BETTER OFF OR NOT?
What can all of this evidence together tell us about the impact man-
aged care has had on society?  Existing literature supports the view that
managed care has significantly shifted practice patterns, reducing the
use of the most advanced and intensive treatments and the use of hospi-
tals.  These changes appear capable of spilling over to non–managed
care patients, who are also treated differently in places where managed
care is prevalent.  Further, changes in treatment patterns and other
incentives accompanying growth in managed care appear to have influ-
enced the structure and capabilities of the medical care system.
There is, however, little evidence that any of these changes have
systematically worsened the health of patients.  Evidence does support
the view that some patients with some conditions have worse outcomes
under managed care than fee-for-service, but evidence also suggests
that other patients do better.  While managed care has not led to overall
worse health, it has led to increasing dissatisfaction.  Patients are
annoyed by a host of factors, including the burdens placed on them in
managed care plans, their perception that health care has become more
impersonal, their perception (not necessarily supported by the evi-
dence) that the health care they are receiving is of lower quality, their
inability to have complete autonomy in the choice of physicians, and
their inability to receive all of the care that they might want, particu-
larly the most advanced and expensive treatments.
At the same time, managed care does seem to have produced some
savings in the form of lower expenditures on health care.  While there
is debate about whether or not these savings will persist over time, evi-
dence so far suggests that managed care patients spend less than
indemnity patients, that spending is lower in high managed care areas,
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and that overall U.S. health expenditures grew at slower rates during at
least part of the era of managed care.
If managed care does not bring about changes in the health of the
population, an assessment of its impact on the current utility of the
population depends on the value of the expenditure reductions it pro-
duces compared to the value of reduced amenities and satisfaction.  At
least to this point, evidence would suggest that the net impact of man-
aged care is that we now purchase less fancy and less satisfying health
care at a cost that is at least somewhat lower.  Society’s utility will be
higher under managed care than under the former regime if the value of
the savings outweighs the value of the lost amenities, and it will be
lower if not.
Judging from the public outcry against managed care, it appears
that many Americans are unwilling to accept this trade-off.  Public
backlash against managed care is increasingly evident, and it has
prompted numerous regulatory and legislative attempts to inhibit the
ability of managed care organizations to engage in activities that they
have used to manage utilization, like capitation, utilization review, and
restricting choices of providers.  
One might wonder, however, about the extent to which the public
reaction reflects the results of careful consideration.  Many Americans
believe that they receive their health care for “free” from their employ-
ers or from the government; they do not take into account the true costs
of purchasing their health care when they evaluate the costs and bene-
fits of health care proposals.  A backlash is understandable when a pub-
lic is confronted with a reduction in amenities without offsetting
savings that are easily recognized, but it need not imply a reasoned
conclusion that managed care has lowered utility.  Furthermore, many
Americans appear to believe that managed care has led to worse health
outcomes, a view for which the currently available empirical evidence
is not strong.  The rejection of managed care might be less pronounced
if debate were informed by actual evidence rather than by anecdote and
media reports. 
On the other hand, there are many informed consumers in the
United States, and there has been public debate about health care mar-
ket changes and health reform proposals for a number of years, fre-
quently highlighting the trade-offs between higher costs, utilization,
and amenities.  Yet the backlash continues.  In some contexts, the
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debate over President Clinton’s health care proposals in 1993 and 1994
was carried out in the framework of a trade-off between encouraging
more restrictive managed care in return for savings that could be put to
other purposes, like covering the uninsured, and it was rejected.  Per-
haps in the managed care backlash, Americans—at least some of
them—have shown their desire to pay, perhaps in large amounts, to
receive the most advanced and expensive health care in the world, even
if it does not make them truly healthier.
It is not clear how many Americans fall into this latter category.  It
is not difficult to believe that much of the managed care bashing
observed today is the result of incomplete information about the true
effects of managed care.  Going forward, informed public debate about
the true costs and benefits of managed care could significantly help the
country arrive at a consensus about the most useful set of public policy
steps to take with respect to managed care.
It would be inappropriate to end this discussion without a comment
on the problem of the uninsured.  The United States is now, and has for
a long time been, burdened with the fact that our health care financing
system leaves many people without coverage at all, subjecting them to
worse than average health care access and leaving them with much
worse than average health outcomes.  The advent of managed care has
done little to change this, either for better or for worse, so it is not truly
a factor in a debate about the impact of managed care on overall utility.
At the same time, one of the early hopes for managed care was reduc-
tions in spending and premiums and a true community spirit, which
might have enabled more employers and individuals to purchase health
insurance and contributed to reductions in the rate of uninsurance. In
practice, though, this does not seem to have happened.
ASSESSING THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Beyond the impact managed care has had on the U.S. health care
system up to this point, there are important questions that it raises
about the future development of the health care system.  In some ways,
these are potentially more important than questions about the impact of
managed care to date.  Managed care has put us on a path toward the
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future that is different from the path we would have been on had we
continued with the traditional fee-for-service system, and these two
paths could easily diverge substantially over the course of time.  This
section highlights four important issues that will contribute to deter-
mining the destination of the managed care path.
First, what effects will managed care have on the future develop-
ment of the delivery system?  Substantial changes in the number and
types of providers and the capacity of the system could compound over
time and greatly alter the future characteristics of the health care deliv-
ery system.  One particularly important possibility is that technology
advancement will be inhibited.  Areas with high levels of managed care
are less likely to adopt new technologies and equipment.  Fewer poten-
tial purchasers for new products may mean less effort devoted to devel-
oping new products for market.  Managed care also appears capable of
influencing the time spent on research.  For example, faculty in medi-
cal schools have traditionally been an important source of new innova-
tions, but they face increasing pressure in managed care–dominated
environments, which may lead them to devote more time to clinical
activities and less to their research efforts.  Moy et al. (1997) and
Campbell et al. (1997) substantiated this possibility, reporting that
increases in managed care activity and competition are associated with
reductions in the number and dollar amount of research awards
obtained by faculty researchers.  One of the historical strengths of the
U.S. health care system is the level of innovation and new advances
that have brought great benefits to patients.  Reductions in innovation
could have very important implications for overall well-being, albeit in
ways that could be hard to assess since we are unlikely to be able to
identify the things not invented because of managed care.
While managed care could well alter the path of future innovation,
it is important to note that it is unlikely to kill innovation altogether.
Managed care plans are unlikely to discourage all innovations; rather,
they can be expected to focus most intently on those that they perceive
to be cost-ineffective.  Managed care may, in fact, substantially reward
new innovations viewed as cost-effective.  Managed care plans may be
able to reward these kinds of innovations much more quickly and sub-
stantially than the traditional fee-for-service system because of the
influence they can have over utilization decisions.  Moreover, managed
care plans have not always been able to cut off the use of new and
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expensive technologies that patients strongly demand (even when they
have tried to do so, patients have frequently been able to turn to either
the courts or the press to gain coverage of new treatments), making it
far from clear that markets for new innovations will dry up under man-
aged care.  A survey conducted by Weisbrod and LaMay (1999), in
fact, reported that managers of firms involved in research and develop-
ment do not view managed care as reducing their inclination to conduct
research on advanced and expensive new technologies, particularly
those that hold the greatest prospects for substantial improvements in
medical capabilities.
Beyond technology development, managed care could also alter
the future development of other aspects of the delivery system.  For
example, existing evidence suggests that managed care plans tend to
use the intensive services provided by specialists less than indemnity
plans, and cross-market comparisons report that areas with high levels
of managed care have fewer specialist physicians.  Growth in managed
care has also fueled powerful discontent among physicians.  This sug-
gests the potential for managed care to reduce the number of candi-
dates for medical school,  particularly the number of students
interested in pursuing specialized career paths, which could leave the
future health care system with a very different mix of providers than
we currently have and influence the future of patient care.
 A second key question with respect to the future impact of man-
aged care is the extent to which costs will be lower.  Evidence up until
now suggests that managed care has lowered costs at least somewhat.
However, this may only consist of one-time savings obtained by
squeezing inefficiencies out of the health care system without funda-
mentally changing the growth path of expenditures.  On the other hand,
the savings seen so far could reflect a persistent lowering of the future
trajectory of expenditures.  The dollar difference between these two
scenarios is large.  If health expenditures continue growing at 3–5 per-
cent per year instead of 10 percent, the accrued savings over time
would be much larger than if we return immediately to 10 percent
growth rates after having lower growth for four or five years in the mid
1990s.
It is difficult to assess the direction in which costs are likely to go.
On one hand, overall spending rose faster between 1997 and 1998 than
it had during the preceding three years, consistent with the suspicion
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that at least some of the savings obtained in the mid 1990s were the
results of one-time savings, and that cost growth is tending toward a
return to its former high level.  On the other hand, the consensus view
among economists is that technology growth is the leading driver of
increasing health care costs (Fuchs 1996), accounting for as much as
half of the rise in expenditures in recent decades (Newhouse 1992;
Chernew et al. 1998).  As noted above, evidence suggests that managed
care can somewhat slow the adoption of new technologies, although
the extent to which this will persist is not clear.
 A third issue is the extent to which the preferences of the popula-
tion will evolve.  While the U.S. population now appears to strongly
value the amenities to which they have become accustomed, prefer-
ences could change over time.  Patients in the United States may adapt
their expectations to managed care and become less concerned about
reductions in amenities once they are not so recent in memory.  Growth
in managed care and increases in the availability of information about
objective quality of care may also lead people to place greater value on
actual quality and health outcomes than on amenities, which may now
be valued in part because there is little other information available on
which to base judgements.
Finally, the impact of managed care in the future depends on the
characteristics of managed care in the future.  The current public back-
lash against managed care has led many managed care organizations to
voluntarily allow more freedom in choosing a provider and impose less
oversight on physician decision making.  Numerous legislative and
regulatory activities aim to further limit the ability of managed care
organizations to engage in the practices they have relied upon in the
past to manage care.  One plausible outcome of this is a weakening of
the most aggressive managed care plans and a corresponding return
toward previous cost and care trends, for better or worse, over the long
run.
Only time will tell, but one can hope that clear discussions among
policymakers and the public can help bring about a well-informed con-
sensus about the importance of health, amenities, and health care
spending that can guide efforts to improve our health care system as we
go forward.  
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 Notes
1. The Luft (1981), Miller and Luft (1994, 1997), and Dudley et al. (1998) reviews
make explicit attempts to include only studies meeting certain quality standards,
including passing peer review and having included reasonable attempts to control
for confounding differences in patient samples.
2. The sets of studies reviewed in these articles are not completely independent.
Although there is no overlap between the two Miller and Luft reviews, both Glied
(2000) and Dudley et al. (1998) to a large extent overlap the Miller and Luft
(1994, 1997) reviews.
3. Cities, defined by the set of Metropolitan Statistical Areas, are the most common
unit of analysis, although others are sometimes used (e.g., states or counties).
4. Some additional studies report evidence on premiums (e.g., Baker and Corts
1996; Feldman, Dowd, and Gifford 1993; Wickizer and Feldstein 1995; Goldberg
and Greenberg 1979; Baker et al. 2000a; Hill and Wolfe 1997).  Some of this work
suggests that managed care premiums are lower, or that overall premiums are
lower in areas with more managed care, although it is not unanimous.  This tends
to corroborate evidence suggesting lower overall expenditures, but since premi-
ums can be influenced by cost shifting and other peculiarities of the insurance
market, this evidence is not as valuable as evidence on expenditures when assess-
ing the impacts on the overall well-being of society.
5. Expenditure data are from the Health Care Financing Administration’s Web site:
www.hcfa.gov.
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